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Alberto Vanzo 
 
Kant’s False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures 
in Its Intellectual Context 
Forthcoming in The Aftermath of Syllogism, edited 
by Luca Gili and Marco Sgarbi (London: Bloomsbury) 
 
 
Kant’s only work in the field of formal logic (or, to use his terms, general pure logic1) is 
the short essay The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures. Kant completed it in 
‘few hours’2 in 1762, shortly before completing three longer works, published in 1763 
and 1764: The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence 
of God, Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy, and 
Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality.3 These 
four works outline a coherent set of doctrines, several of which are discussed in more 
than one work4 and differ significantly from Kant’s earlier and later views. In fact, two 
periods of silence separate the works of 1762–1764 from Kant’s other major 
publications. Kant only published minor, occasional writings from 1757 to 1761 and 
from 1765 to 1766.5  
Among Kant’s works from the early 1760s, the False Subtlety has received the least 
attention from scholars. Most systematic studies focus on Kant’s views on syllogistic 
reduction. Interpreters diverge widely on what patterns of inference Kant allows,6 what 
                                                        
1 Kant rarely uses the expression “formal logic” (A131/B170). However, he often stresses the formal 
character of general pure logic (e.g. in A55/B79, A59–60/B84–85). References to the Critique of 
Pure Reason appeal to the 1st- and 2nd-edition pagination (A and B). Otherwise, the pagination to 
which I refer in Kant’s texts is from his Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Königlich Preußische (Deutsche) 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1900– . I use the following abbreviations: Beweisgrund = Der 
einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes; Deutl. = Untersuchung 
über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral; M. Herder = 
Metaphysik Herder; Größen = Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit 
einzuführen; Spitzf. = Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren. Translations are 
from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, 
Cambridge 1992– . I have replaced American spelling with British spelling and “characteristic mark” 
with “mark” as a translation of “Merkmal”. 
2 Spitzf., 2:57. 
3 I have listed these works in the order of composition, that differs from the order of publication. It was 
established on the basis of philological criteria after several controversies. See Mariano Campo, La 
genesi del criticismo kantiano, Varese 1953, 249–251. 
4 For instance, the theory of formal and material principles of truth outlined in Deutl., 2:293–296 
expands on ideas sketched in Spitzf., 2:60–61. The distinction between logical and real opposition is 
first introduced in Beweisgrund, 2:85–87 and then explained in Größen. The mistake of starting 
philosophical inquiries with definitions is criticized first in Beweisgrund, 2:66 and then in Deutl., 
2:281–282, 283, 284, 285, 288–289, 292–293. 
5 They are the announcement of his lectures on physical geography (1757); New Doctrine of Motion 
and Rest (1758); An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism (1759); Thoughts on the Occasion of 
Mr. Johann Friedrich von Funk’s Untimely Death (1760); and the announcement of Kant’s lectures 
for the winter semester 1765–1766. 
6 On whether Kant admits contraposition and obversion, see Kirk D. Wilson, ‘The Mistaken Simplicity 
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reduction procedures he contemplates,7 and whether he intends them to apply to all valid 
forms of the second, third, and fourth figure.8 The few historical studies mostly focus on 
the relation of Kant’s claims on syllogism with the views that he developed in the 
Critical period.9 Little has been written on how the False Subtlety relates to the doctrines 
outlined in Kant’s other works from 1762–1764 and to the views of Kant’s 
contemporaries and immediate predecessors. It is especially unclear who Kant’s 
polemical targets were and to what extent Kant’s polemical aims shaped his views on 
syllogism. In the False Subtlety, Kant claims that second-, third-, and fourth-figure 
syllogisms are valid only insofar as they can be reduced to the first figure and he denies 
that logicians should dwell on the doctrine of modes and figures. By putting forward 
these views, does Kant intend to reject ‘Leibniz’s syllogistic logic’, as Silvestro 
Marcucci states,10 or is he ‘undoubtedly’ using Leibniz as his source, as Adolfo León 
Gómez claims?11 Does Kant move ‘a small step’ away from Christian Wolff’s position, 
as Nicholas Rescher holds,12 or does he reject it altogether, as Michael Wolff suggests?13  
This chapter discusses how Kant’s views on the foundations of syllogistic inference 
relate to their immediate intellectual context – the views of eighteenth-century German 
authors writing on syllogism – and to the conception of metaphysics that Kant develops 
in 1762–1764. We will see that Kant’s positions are, on the whole, rather original, even 
                                                                                                                                                                   
of Kant’s Enthymematic Treatment of the Second and Third Figures’, Kant-Studien, 66 (1975), 404–
417, 413; Mirella Capozzi, ‘Osservazioni sulla riduzione delle figure sillogistiche in Kant’, Annali 
della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell’Università di Siena, 1 (1980), 79–98, 88–91; Theodor Ebert, 
‘Michael Wolff über Syllogismen bei Aristoteles und Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant’, Journal for 
General Philosophy of Science, 40 (2009), 357–372, 367–368. On whether Kant admits the 
transposition of premises, see Capozzi, ‘Osservazioni sulla riduzione delle figure sillogistiche in 
Kant’, 87, 89; Lorenzo Pozzi, Da Ramus a Kant: Il dibattito sulla sillogistica, Milan 1981, 98; Johan 
Arnt Myrstad, ‘Kant’s Treatment of the Bocardo and Barocco Syllogisms’, in Valerio Rohden et al. 
(ed.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants: Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. 
4.–9. Sept. 2005 in São Paulo, Berlin 2008, vol. 5, 163–174, 164n3. 
7 See Capozzi’s and Myrstad’s criticisms of Wilson and the debate between Theodor Ebert and 
Michael Wolff, respectively in Capozzi, ‘Osservazioni sulla riduzione delle figure sillogistiche in 
Kant’; Myrstad, ‘Kant’s Treatment of the Bocardo and Barocco Syllogisms’; Ebert, ‘Michael Wolff 
über Syllogismen bei Aristoteles und Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant’; Michael Wolff, ‘Volkommene 
Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant’, Journal for General Philosophy of 
Science, 40 (2009), 341–355; Michael Wolff, ‘Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine 
Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant: Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. 
Teil 2’, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 41 (2010), 359–371; Theodor Ebert, ‘Michael 
Wolff über Kant als Logiker: Eine Stellungnahme zu Wolffs Metakritik’, Journal for General 
Philosophy of Science, 41 (2010), 373–382. 
8 Spitzf., 2:58 might suggest that this is the case. Pozzi (Da Ramus a Kant, 100) and Myrstad (‘Kant’s 
Treatment of the Bocardo and Barocco Syllogisms’, 172) deny it. 
9 See esp. Wolfgang Malzkorn, ‘Kants Kritik an der traditionellen Syllogistik’, History and Philosophy 
of Logic, 16 (1995), 75–88; Marco Sgarbi, Logica e metafisica nel Kant precritico: L’ambiente 
intellettuale di Königsberg e la formazione della filosofia kantiana, Frankfurt a. M. 2010, 185–218. 
10 Silvestro Marcucci, ‘Introduzione’, in Immanuel Kant, La falsa sottigliezza delle quattro figure 
sillogistiche, ed. Silvestro Marcucci, Pisa 2001, 9–18, 17, see 16. 
11 Adolfo León Gómez, ‘La silogística en Leibniz y Kant, y su parentesco’, Ideas y Valores, 92–93 
(1993), 41–46, 43. 
12 Nicholas Rescher, Galen and the Syllogism: An Examination of the Thesis That Galen Originated the 
Fourth Figure of the Syllogism in the Light of New Data from Arabic Sources, Pittsburgh (Penn.) 
1966, 37. 
13 Wolff, ‘Volkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse’, 354–355. 
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though they lack the marked independence from the intellectual context that one can 
find in Kant’s Critical works.14 Despite Kant’s polemical tone, his views on syllogism 
are not mainly motivated by polemical purposes. Instead, Kant’s views on the 
foundations of syllogism bear an interesting relation with his views on metaphysics, as 
they reflect the role that Kant assigns to syllogism in the process of metaphysical 
inquiry. This is in keeping with Kant’s later works, where several aspects of his formal 
logic are influenced by transcendental logic. 
I will focus on the relation of the False Subtlety with the views of Christian Wolff 
and some of his German successors. However, I do not intend to suggest that Kant was 
only influenced by these authors.15 I will not attempt to identify all influences on Kant’s 
conception or syllogism, nor will I survey all German writings on syllogism of the 
period “from Wolff to Kant”. I will only chart a representative sample of positions. This 
is sufficient to shed light on the degree of originality of the False Subtlety, to assess 
competing claims on the putative influences of Leibniz and Wolff on Kant, and to give 
the reader a sense of what questions were discussed, what the main points of 
disagreement were, and on which issues views were so fragmented that advancing a new 
view was itself a conventional move. Having outlined the positions of Kant’s immediate 
predecessors (§ 1), I will illustrate Kant’s views on the foundations of syllogisms and on 
the status of the second, third, and fourth figure (§ 2). I will then turn to their relation 
with the views of Kant’s immediate predecessors (§ 3.1) and with Kant’s own views on 
the foundation of metaphysics (§ 3.2). I will only discuss categorical syllogisms, as 
opposed to hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms, because they are the only type of 
syllogism that the False Subtlety takes into account. 
1 Kant’s Immediate Predecessors on Syllogism 
Kant’s immediate predecessors generally agreed that, out of the 64 possible syllogistic 
moods and 256 syllogistic forms, 10 moods and 19 forms are valid.16 They also agreed 
                                                        
14 This is in line with Giorgio Tonelli’s overall assessment of Kant’s stance between 1745 and 1768. 
See his Elementi metodologici e metafisici in Kant dal 1745 al 1768: Saggio di sociologia della 
conoscenza, Turin 1959, 209. This is one of the most detailed studies of the relation of Kant’s views 
with those of his peers. Tonelli’s discussion of the False Subtlety (204–208) is unusually cursory. 
15 For a broader discussion of the influences on the False Subtlety, that complements this chapter, see 
Sgarbi, Logica e metafisica nel Kant precritico, 185–218. 
16 See e.g. Joachim Georg Daries, Introductio in artem inveniendi seu logicam theoretico-practicam, 
Jena 1742, Analytica § 257. Categorical syllogisms are composed of three propositions, each of 
which can be universal affirmative (A), universal negative (E), particular affirmative (I) or particular 
negative (O), for a total of 64 possible combinations (AAA, AAE, AEE, … OOO). Each 
combination is called a mood. Besides the form of the propositions that compose it, syllogisms are 
identified by the position of the middle term (which is the term that appears in the premises, but not 
in the conclusion). For instance, the middle term of a syllogism of mood EAE can be the subject of 
the major premise and the predicate of the minor premise (no mammals are plants; all humans are 
mammals; no humans are plants). It can also be the predicate of the minor and major premise (no 
humans are plants; all roses are plants; no roses are humans). The position of the middle term 
determines the figure of the syllogism. In the first figure, the middle term is the subject of the major 
premise and the predicate of the minor premise. In the second figure, the middle term is the predicate 
of both premises. In the third figure, the middle term is the subject of both premises. In the fourth 
figure, the middle term is the predicate of the major premise and the subject of the minor premise. 
The form of a syllogism (EAE-1, EAE-2, etc.) is determined by its mood and figure. Unlike current-
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that all valid syllogisms in the second, third, and fourth figure can be reduced to the first 
figure.17 However, they disagreed on two questions: on what grounds we should accept 
those moods and forms as valid and whether second-, third-, and fourth-figure 
syllogisms are useful and should be studied. Kant’s answers to these questions are just 
two among a varied array of views that were upheld by his predecessors and 
contemporaries.  
1.1 The Foundations of Syllogistic Inference 
Kant’s immediate predecessors resorted to two methods to establish the validity of the 
19 syllogistic forms. They are the method of principles and the reductive method.18 The 
method of principles amounts to formulating a series of rules to which all valid 
syllogisms must conform and excluding the forms which violate them, until one is left 
with the 19 valid forms. For instance, EAA and EAI violate the rule that, if one of the 
premises is negative, the conclusion must be negative. The reductive method amounts to 
establishing the validity of a privileged class of syllogisms (typically, those of the first 
figure) and reducing all other syllogisms to them. Kant will do this by arguing that their 
conclusions can be inferred from the premises by means of a syllogism of the privileged 
class, in combination with non-syllogistic inferences.19 
Martin Knutzen, a rather independent Wolffian20 who was Kant’s university teacher, 
preferred the method of principles.21 He held that prior attempts to employ the reductive 
method failed: 
Some learned men tried, with little success, to bring the entire doctrine of syllogisms under 
a single formula and a very general rule. Those who expressed expressed the foundation of 
affirmative and negative syllogisms with two very general rules [as Kant would do in the 
                                                                                                                                                                   
day authors, Kant and his predecessors accepted the inference of I- and O-sentences from A- and E-
sentences by subalternation. If this inference is rejected, the valid forms will be 15, not 19. See 
Irwing M. Copi et al., Introduction to Logic, 14th ed., Harlow (United Kingdom) 2014, 244.  
17 See e.g. Daries, Introductio in artem inveniendi, Analytica §§ 274–275; Christian August Crusius, 
Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniß, Leipzig 1747, repr. 1965, §§ 
333–335; Hermann Samuel Reimarus, Die Vernunftlehre, als eine Anweisung zum richtigen 
Gebrauche der Vernunft in der Erkenntniß der Wahrheit, Hamburg 1756, §§ 142, 148. 
18 Paul Thom mentions a third method, the method of counterexamples. As far as I am aware, Kant and 
his immediate predecessors did not rely on it. See Paul Thom, ‘Syllogismus; Syllogistik’, in Joachim 
Ritter et al. (eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Basel 1971–2007, vol. 10, 687–707, 
690. 
19 Non-syllogistic inferences may be accepted as valid independently from syllogisms (Spitzf., 2:50). 
Alternatively, they may be regarded as enthymematic hypothetical syllogisms which can be reduced 
to syllogisms of the privileged class (Christian Wolff, Philosophia rationalis sive Logica, 3rd revised 
ed., Frankfurt a.M. 1740, repr. with notes and an index by Jean École in Christian Wolff, Gesammelte 
Werke, Olms 1962– , sect. 2, vol. 1, §§ 413, 415, 460). 
20 Several passages of his logic manual stress the importance of sensibility as the ‘basis and principle of 
all our cognitions’ (Martin Knutzen, Elementa philosophiae rationalis seu logicae, Königsberg 1747, 
repr. 1991, § 27; see §§ 64, 289n). They recall passages by anti-Wolffians like Crusius more than 
Wolff’s works. See e.g. Christian August Crusius, Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten, 
wiefern sie den zufälligen entgegen gesetzet werden, Leipzig 1745, repr. 1964, §§ 45, 56; Crusius, 
Weg zur Gewißheit, § 53. Knutzen’s preference for the method of principles over the reductive 
method is a point of divergence between him and Wolff. 
21 Knutzen, Elementa philosophiae rationalis, §§ 444–446. 
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False Subtlety] were not more successful.22 
Most other authors privileged the reductive method. Among them was Christian 
Wolff, who was by far the most influential writer on logic in eighteenth-century 
Germany. Wolff shares the then widespread distrust for the fourth figure, which he 
disregards entirely.23 He explains how second- and third-figure syllogisms can be 
reduced to the first figure.24 He adds that ‘the inferences that take place in the second 
and third figure can be accepted as valid [richtig] only because it is possible to reduce 
them to the first figure’.25 He even goes as far as to claim that second- and third-figure 
syllogisms are actually ‘cryptic first-figure syllogisms’,26 that is, first-figure syllogisms 
whose ‘authentic form is not apparent’.27 First-figure syllogisms, in turn, depend on the 
dictum de omni et nullo (henceforth simply “the dictum”), which is the conjunction of 
two principles: 
Dictum de omni: ‘Whatever can be affirmed of a whole genus or species is 
also affirmed of whatever is contained under that genus or species’.28  
Dictum de nullo: ‘Whatever is denied of a whole genus or species must also 
be denied of whatever is contained under that genus or species’.29 
Wolff characterizes genera and species extensionally, as classes, but also 
                                                        
22 Knutzen, Elementa philosophiae rationalis, § 443. Knutzen criticizes two such putative principles, 
including Joachim Georg Daries’ principium convenientiae, and he notes that the dictum de omni et 
nullo (endorsed by Wolff) is disputed. Like Knutzen, Samuel Christian Hollmann has no time for 
syllogistic reductions. See his Philosophia rationalis, quae logica vulgo dicitur, multum aucta et 
emendata, Göttingen 1746, § 474. Among earlier texts, the widely read Port-Royal Logic employed 
the method of principles. See Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, The Port-Royal Logic, ed. Thomas 
Spencer Baynes, Edinburgh 1861, 190–191. 
23 The same attitude toward the fourth figure can be found among Wolff’s disciples. His faithful 
follower, Friedrich Christian Baumeister, explains what the fourth figure is, but he only provides 
rules for the first three figures and he only mentions their moods. See his Institutiones philosophiae 
rationalis, Wittenberg 1735, repr. in Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, sect. 3, vol. 24, §§ 260, 269–278, 
281; Hollmann, Philosophia rationalis, §§ 455–474. For an overview of early modern attitudes 
toward the fourth figure, see Rescher, Galen and the Syllogism, 34–38. 
24 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, §§ 384, 389, 396. Wolff’s German Logic focuses only on first-figure 
syllogisms. See Christian Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken von den Kräfften des menschlichen 
Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkäntniß der Wahrheit, ed. Hans Werner Arndt, in 
Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, sect. 1, vol. 1, Hildesheim 1962 [1754], Ch. 4. 
25 Christian Wolff, Ausführliche Nachricht von seinen eigenen Schrifften, die er in deutscher Sprache 
[…] heraus gegeben, 2nd enlarged ed., Frankfurt a.M. 1733, repr. in Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, sect. 
2, vol. 9, § 201. 
26 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, §§ 385, 397. 
27 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, § 365. 
28 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, § 346. 
29 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, § 347. Christian Wolff (§ 402) ascribes the thesis that the dictum is the 
foundation of syllogisms to Aristotle. However, this is controversial. See e.g. Ebert, ‘Michael Wolff 
über Syllogismen bei Aristoteles und Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant’, 357–365; Michael Wolff, 
‘Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant: Eine Stellungnahme 
zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 1’, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 41 (2010), 
199–213, 208–212. 
6 
intensionally, as sets of shared features.30 Accordingly, the dictum can be read both 
extensionally, as in Wolff’s German Logic, and intensionally, as in the works of his 
disciple Georg Friedrich Meier.31 On the extensional interpretation, the dictum states 
that whatever property can be truthfully ascribed or denied of all members of a class can 
be truthfully affirmed or denied of any of those members individually.32 On the 
intensional interpretation, the dictum states that whatever feature is part of the content of 
the concept of a genus or species is also part of the content of the concepts of its lower 
species or genera. In Wolff’s view, two of the four forms of the first figure, Barbara 
(AAA-1) and Darii (AII-1), are ‘nothing else than the distinct application’ of the dictum 
de omni. The other two forms, Celarent (EAE-1) and Ferio (EIO-1), are applications of 
the dictum de nullo.33  
Since the dictum is the foundation of first-figure syllogisms and syllogisms in other 
figures can be reduced to them, the dictum is the ‘solid and unshaken foundation on 
which the entire doctrine of syllogism is to be erected’.34 It is a solid foundation because 
its truth is evident to whoever contemplates it. However, it is not a first principle, but an 
intermediate principle, because it can be proven on the basis of a more basic principle. 
According to Wolff, one can prove the dictum by showing that its negation involves a 
contradiction and, thus, is false.35 Being a reductio ad absurdum, this argument 
presupposes the validity of the law of excluded middle. Wolff regards it as a corollary of 
the law of contradiction,36 which is the first principle of his entire philosophy. In Wolff’s 
eyes, then, the law of contradiction provides the ultimate basis of the reductive strategy 
for the foundation of syllogistic inference. Meier explains the rationale of this strategy 
with his usual clarity:  
By deriving the rules of syllogisms from the law of contradiction, we prove that they are 
not, as it were, arbitrary commands of philosophers, but absolutely necessary truths, and that 
the syllogisms which are formed in accordance with them have a necessarily correct form, 
on which we can rely with the most perfect trust.37 
Wolff’s successors were generally sympathetic toward his attempt to reduce all 
syllogisms to an intermediate principle which, in turn, depends on one or more first 
                                                        
30 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, §§ 44–45. 
31 See Wolff, Gedancken von den Kräfften, Ch. 4, §§ 2, 4; Georg Friedrich Meier, Vernunftlehre, ed. 
Günter Schenk, Halle/Saale 1997 [1752], § 401; Georg Friedrich Meier, Auszug aus der 
Vernunftlehre, in Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 16, § 363. 
32 Crusius clearly explains this interpretation of the dictum in his Weg zur Gewißheit, § 282. 
33 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, § 380n. 
34 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, § 353n. Additionally, Wolff formulates foundational principles for 
second- and third-figure syllogisms (Philosophia rationalis, §§ 381, 389). The principle of second-
figure syllogisms is a corollary of the dictum. The principle of third-figure syllogisms is a procedure 
to obtain them from first-figure syllogisms. 
35 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, §§ 347n, 348n; Gedancken von den Kräfften, Ch. 4, § 5. As Matt 
Hettche notes, ‘a proposition could be known immediately one way and yet, in another way, follow 
as a conclusion of a sound deductive argument’ (‘Christian Wolff’, in Edward N. Zalta [ed.], The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2008 Edition, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/ 
entries/wolff-christian/, § 6). According to Wolff, this is the case for the dictum. 
36 See Christian Wolff, Philosophia prima sive ontologia, Frankfurt a.M. 1736, repr. in Wolff, 
Gesammelte Werke, sect. 1, vol. 3, § 54. 
37 Meier, Vernunftlehre, § 400. 
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principles of all philosophy. However, they disagreed on whether the dictum is a suitable 
intermediate principle. Joachim Georg Daries, whose logic displays some independence 
from Wolff, claimed that the dictum depends on the principium convenientiae: ‘the 
things that can be combined with the same third item can also be combined with each 
other under the same respect’.38 The Wolffian Hermann Samuel Reimarus agreed that a 
variant of the principium convenientiae is the foundation of all syllogisms, but he 
dispensed with the dictum altogether.39 Reimarus had two complaints against the dictum. 
It is not basic, because it depends on the laws of identity and contradiction. It cannot be 
straightforwardly applied to second-, third-, or fourth-figure syllogisms, because what 
‘is affirmed or denied’ by them ‘is not always predicated of the whole species of genus 
[…] Therefore, it was even more necessary’ for him ‘to establish the validity 
[Richtigkeit] of all syllogisms by means of a more general rule’ than the dictum,40 the 
principium convenientiae.  
While the limited applicability of the dictum led Reimarus to replace it with a 
different principle, it led others to complement it with other principles. Meier introduced 
three additional principles: ‘if the sufficient reason is true, its consequence too is true 
[…] if the consequence is false, its sufficient reason too is false’; ‘if one of [two] 
contradictory judgements is true, the other is false, and if it is false, the other is true’; ‘if 
a judgement is true, what has been derived from it through a truth-preserving logical 
combination must be true too’.41 For the anti-Wolffian Christian August Crusius,42 the 
dictum is just one (the sixteenth) of the 43 principles of valid syllogistic inferences. Each 
of those principles derives from the law of contradiction, the principle of sufficient 
reason, or both.  
In sum, most of Kant’s immediate predecessors shared the goal of establishing the 
validity of syllogistic inference through a reductive strategy. However, they disagreed 
on what principles should provide the basis for the reduction. Crusius, Daries, Meier and 
Reimarus all made somewhat original proposals which disagreed with Wolff and one 
another. Nor would the practice of formulating new principles of syllogisms stop with 
the publication of the False Subtlety in 1762. Lambert, whose views on syllogism were 
antithetical to Kant’s, and Feder, who endorsed Kant’s central claims, formulated new 
principles of syllogisms in 1764 and 1774.43 Even the author of a very favourable review 
of the False Subtlety took the opportunity to correct Kant’s principles.44  
                                                        
38 Daries, Introductio in artem inveniendi, Praecognita § 19n; Analytica §§ 252–253. 
39 Reimarus, Vernunftlehre, §§ 138–139. 
40 Reimarus, Vernunftlehre, § 139. Reimarus could employ the second- and third-figure syllogisms 
discussed in Section 2.2 as examples. 
41 Meier, Vernunftlehre, §§ 402–404; Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, §§ 364–366. According to Meier, 
these principles follow from the law of contradiction (Vernunftlehre, § 400). 
42 Crusius, Weg zur Gewißheit, §§ 273–296. 
43 See Johann Heinrich Lambert, Neues Organon oder Gedanken über die Erforschung und 
Bezeichnung des Wahren und dessen Unterscheidung vom Irrthum und Schein, Leipzig 1764, vol. 1, 
142–143; Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, Logik und Metaphysik, 4th ed., Göttingen 1774, § 43. 
Feder’s references indicate that he regarded his new principle as equivalent both to the dictum and to 
the principles of the False Subtlety. The first edition of Feder’s Logik und Metaphysik, which I could 
not access, was published in 1769. 
44 Anon., review of Immanuel Kant, Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren, Briefe, 
die Neueste Litteratur betreffend, 22 (1765), 147–158, 150–151. Tonelli, following Erich Adickes, 
states that the author of this review was Moses Mendelssohn. See Tonelli, Elementi metodologici e 
8 
1.2 The Status and Usefulness of the Second, Third, and Fourth Figure 
Within Wolff’s logic, the first figure has a privileged status for three reasons: 
 
(a) it is the only figure to which all syllogisms of any other figure can be reduced.  
(b) it is the only figure in which there are syllogisms with universal affirmative 
conclusions (in Barbara), particular affirmative conclusions (in Darii), universal 
negative conclusions (in Celarent), and particular negative conclusions (in Ferio).45 
By contrast, second-figure syllogisms only have negative conclusions. Third-figure 
syllogisms only have particular conclusions. Fourth-figure syllogisms have 
negative conclusions and particular affirmative conclusions, but not universal 
affirmative conclusions. 
(c) first-figure syllogisms are more natural than syllogisms in the other figures. This 
naturalness thesis might mean:  
(natural1) people have a disposition to employ first-figure syllogisms more 
often than syllogisms in the other figures. 
(natural2) formulating first-figure syllogisms is easier (takes up fewer 
cognitive resources) than formulating syllogisms in the other figures. 
(natural3) people typically formulate first-figure syllogisms more quickly 
than syllogisms in the other figures. 
With his naturalness thesis, Wolff means at least natural1, because he holds that 
the naturalness of first-figure syllogisms derives from their proximity to the 
dictum.46 According to Wolff, we have an innate disposition to follow the laws of 
logic,47 some of them more than others. When we reason, we do not typically 
follow the inference schemata of the second, third, or fourth figure, but the 
dictum,48 of which the forms of first-figure syllogisms are paraphrases. 
 
Because of its primacy, Wolff calls the first figure ‘the perfect figure’.49 He claims 
that the first figure ‘is sufficient for reasoning’ and that ‘we can be content with the first 
figure alone’.50 His discussion of the second and third figure in the Latin Logic provides 
reasons for dismissing them. He had done so in the shorter German Logic, which 
                                                                                                                                                                   
metafisici in Kant dal 1745 al 1768, 208. The Zeitschriften der Aufklärung website (http://www.ub. 
uni-bielefeld.de/diglib/aufkl/browse/brieneulit/21765.html, visited on 10 July 2014) states that the 
author was Friedrich Gabriel Resewitz. 
45 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, § 378; Gedancken von den Kräfften, Ch. 4, § 14. 
46 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, § 380: ‘First-figure syllogisms are the most natural, that is, they are 
the closest to the dictum de omni et nullo’. 
47 Wolff, Gedancken von den Kräfften, Ch. 16, § 3. 
48 Logic as a discipline (logica artificialis docens) illustrates the principles that we spontaneously 
follow in our ordinary reasoning, called ‘natural logic’ (Philosophia rationalis, § 11). ‘When we 
reason within natural logic, we do not pay attention to anything else than the dictum de omni et nullo’ 
(§ 280). 
49 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, § 401. See § 400: ‘a figure in which all propositions can be inferred is 
called a perfect figure’. 
50 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, § 379. 
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discusses only first-figure syllogisms.51 
Of Wolff’s reasons for privileging the first figure, (a) and (b) were not disputed.52 
However, his claim that the first figure is the most natural was problematic. Not only did 
its justification invoke the dictum, that was controversial, but also, on all three readings, 
it is an empirical claim. Yet, Wolff provided no empirical evidence for it. 
One could challenge the naturalness thesis in two ways.53 First, one could hold a 
large-scale empirical inquiry of people’s reasoning patterns, which Kant’s predecessors 
did not carry out. Hence, there was no hard evidence to establish whether people reason 
mostly in the first figure, as Wolff held, or whether ‘the understanding thinks almost 
more often by means of the other syllogistic figures, especially the second and fourth, 
than […] in the first’, as Crusius stated.54 Second, one could claim that syllogisms in the 
second or third figure are ‘extremely natural and simple’, whereas their reductions to the 
first figure are ‘very convoluted and forced’.55 Hollmann and Knutzen held this.  
An example that supports their view can be found in Johann Heinrich Lambert’s New 
Organon, which was published shortly after Kant’s False Subtlety.56 According to 
Lambert, when we are faced with the sentences: 
 
All circles are round. 
No rectangles are round. 
 
we can infer “no rectangles are circles” straightaway. The inference with which we do 
so is a second-figure syllogism in Camestres (AEE-2). Alternatively, we can derive the 
conclusion from the premises with two immediate inferences and a first-figure 
syllogism: 
 
(a) from “all circles are round” we can infer “whatever is not round is not a circle”, 
that is, “no non-round things are circles” through contraposition; 
(b) from “no rectangles are round” we can infer “all rectangles are non-round” 
through obversion; 
(c) we can use the conclusions of these inferences as the premises of a syllogism in 
Celarent (EAE-1): 
 
 
                                                        
51 Ludwig Philipp Thümmig’s manual of Wolffian logic too discusses only the first figure. See his 
Institutiones philosophiæ Wolfianæ, in usus academicos adornatæ, Frankfurt a.M. 1725–1726, repr. 
in Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, sect. 3, vol. 19, part 1, §§ 33–50. Reimarus (Vernunftlehre, 143) agrees 
that it is not necessary to discuss any other figure besides the first. However, he states that using the 
other figures may be useful in dialectical contexts, to refute one’s opponent. Although Kant agrees, 
he prefers to ‘pass over in silence’ this ‘academic athleticism’ because ‘it does not contribute greatly 
to the advancement of truth’ (Spitzf., 2:57). 
52 Several authors stated (b), e.g. Crusius, Weg zur Gewißheit, §§ 333–335; Knutzen, Elementa 
philosophiae rationalis, § 456; Reimarus, Vernunftlehre, §§ 142, 148. 
53 Rescher (Galen and the Syllogism, 42) noted this. 
54 Crusius, Weg zur Gewißheit, § 332. Crusius’ suggestion that ‘one can find’ this ‘in experience’ would 
have hardly convinced Wolff. 
55 Hollmann, Philosophia rationalis, § 474; see Knutzen, Elementa philosophiae rationalis, § 457. 
56 Lambert, Neues Organon, vol. 1, 139–140. I have modified Lambert’s original example, which 
appears to mistake a fourth-figure syllogism in non-canonical form for a first-figure syllogism. 
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 No non-round things are circles. 
 All rectangles are non-round. 
∴  No rectangles are circles. 
 
When Wolff’s peers claimed that second- and third-figure syllogisms are more 
‘natural and simple’ than their ‘convoluted and forced’ reductions to the first figure,57 
they appear to have had examples like this in mind. They expected their readers to agree 
that formulating the second-figure syllogism is easier (contra natural2) and faster 
(contra natural3) than formulating their reductions.58 If this is true, if the example can 
be generalized, and if people have a disposition to employ easier and faster inferences 
more often than than harder and slower ones, there might be reason to reject natural1 
too.  
However things may be with regard to the naturalness thesis, Crusius highlighted 
another reason why one should not be content with the first figure, as Wolff had 
suggested. All syllogistic forms should be discussed because the aim of logic is to 
explain all formally valid inference forms. Crusius makes this clear when he criticizes 
those who ‘did not want to admit any figures and moods that can be reduced to moods 
that do not belong to the first figure’.59 With this convoluted expression, Crusius might 
be referring to those syllogistic forms, like Disamis (IAI-3), which can only be reduced 
to the first figure by being first reduced to the third or fourth figure.60 The complexity of 
their reduction provides no reason to disregard them because, 
if the understanding can form syllogisms in various ways and if logic must explain its 
manifold operations, it is not superfluous to learn those forms too […]61  
Crusius’ tendency toward comprehensiveness contrasts sharply with Kant’s view that 
‘logic’ should only focus on the ‘simplest mode of cognition’,62 to which other modes of 
cognition (like second-, third-, and fourth-figure syllogisms) can be reduced.  
Given these divergences, what constituted a ‘false [i.e. useless] subtlety’ was far from 
                                                        
57 Hollmann, Philosophia rationalis, § 474. 
58 Lambert (Neues Organon, vol. 1, 139) argues against natural2. He states that the reduction of his 
example involves an immediate inference, and a proposition derived through an immediate inference 
‘is definitely not always as evident as the proposition from which we derived it’. Crusius (Weg zur 
Gewißheit, § 332) argues against natural3. He notes that the propositions from which we can infer a 
conclusion may come to mind in a different order from that of the first figure, as in Lambert’s 
example. In this case, we can infer the conclusion more quickly by employing a second-figure 
syllogism than immediate inferences and a first-figure syllogism. 
59 Crusius, Weg zur Gewißheit, § 331. 
60 A syllogism in Disamis can be reduced to Darii (AII-1) in two ways. One can transform it into Datisi 
(AII-3) through transposition of the premises, and transform the latter into Darii (AII-1) through 
simple conversion of the minor premise (Capozzi, ‘Osservazioni sulla riduzione delle figure 
sillogistiche in Kant’, 86). Alternatively, one can transform Disamis into Dimatis (IAI-4) and this 
into Darii (AII-1) through simple conversion of the major premise, transposition of the premises, and 
simple conversion of the conclusion (Myrstad, ‘Kant’s Treatment of the Bocardo and Barocco 
Syllogisms’, 166–168). 
61 Crusius, Weg zur Gewißheit, § 331. For a similar point, see Rogelio Rovira, ‘¿Es una “falsa sutileza” 
la division lógica de las figuras del silogismo? Sobre la crítica de Kant a la doctrina aristotélica del 
silogismo categórico’, Teorema, 29 (2010), 5–21, 19. 
62 Spitzf., 2:56. 
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agreed. Those who stressed the preeminence of the first figure, like Wolff, noted that the 
other figures can be reduced to it and held that discussing them thoroughly is a useless 
subtlety. Those who advocated the usefulness of three or all four figures, like Hollmann 
and Knutzen, often refrained from ‘annoying readers’ by ‘dwelling on the reduction 
principles with which Scholastics filled the memory of their young pupils’.63 If Knutzen, 
who wrote these words in 1751, had lived long enough to read the False Subtlety, he 
might well have regarded Kant’s reduction principles as the truly useless subtlety in the 
doctrine of syllogism.  
2 Kant’s View of Syllogism in the False Subtlety 
In this context, Kant’s False Subtlety puts forward a very clear-cut view. The only 
portion of the doctrine of syllogism that logic should be concerned with is that regarding 
the first figure. Although ‘valid inferences may be drawn in all […] four figures’,64 there 
is no need to dwell on the second, third, or fourth figure, the ‘rules peculiar’ to each of 
them, or the list of valid forms which are found in each figure.65 This is because the aim 
of logic is ‘reducing everything to the simplest mode of cognition’66 and syllogisms in 
the second, third, and fourth figure can be reduced to combinations of first-figure 
syllogisms and immediate inferences. Kant defends these views by putting forward an 
account of the function of syllogism, two new principles of syllogisms, a sketch of the 
procedures for reducing the second, third, and fourth figure to the first, and the claim 
that people ordinarily follow those procedures when making inferences.  
2.1 Background: Marks, Judgements, and Syllogisms 
Kant discusses the foundations of syllogistic inference in the first two sections of the 
False Subtlety. There, he introduces two first principles of all syllogisms, building on his 
notion of mark and his definitions of judgement and syllogism. Kant holds that the 
content of some concepts is simple and unanalysable. Other concepts derive from the 
combination of further concepts, which can be identified through a process of analysis. 
An example is provided in Figure 1. Sometimes, Kant calls mark [Merkmal, nota] a 
concept that composes another concept: for instance, when he mentions ‘a mark of a 
mark’.67 Other times, he calls mark a property of a thing (‘a mark of the thing itself’68). I 
                                                        
63 Knutzen, Elementa philosophiae rationalis, § 457. 
64 Spitzf., 2:55. 
65 Spitzf., 2:56. This claim relates to the practical purpose of the False Subtlety (2:57). Kant published it 
together with the announcement of his logic lectures to explain why they covered syllogistic moods 
and figures only briefly. Unfortunately, we cannot check this statement against the transcripts of 
Kant’s lectures from those years. The earliest logic transcripts that are available to us, the Logik 
Blomberg and Logik Philippi, are based on lectures from the 1770s. 
66 Spitzf., 2:56. Accordingly, the ‘four modes of inference ought to be simple, unmixed and free from 
concealed supplementary inferences’ (2:56). As we shall see, in Kant’s view, only one of the four 
figures satisfies this requirement. 
67 Spitzf., 2:49. Such a mark is a concept, rather than a property, because Kant calls it “the middle 
principal concept” of a syllogism (2:48). 
68 Spitzf., 2:49. 
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will call the former marksc and the latter marksp.69 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The content of a concept 
 
‘To compare something as a mark with a thing is to judge’.70 The result of this 
comparison is a mental content, a judgement, that combines a subject concept with a 
predicate concept. The subject concept designates the ‘thing’, broadly understood,71 that 
is the subject of predication. The predicate concept designates a feature (‘a mark of 
some thing or other’72). The copula unaccompanied by negation expresses the belonging 
of the markp to the subject of predication. The copula accompanied by negation 
expresses the non-belonging of the markp to the subject of predication.73  
‘That which is a mark of a mark of a thing is called a mediate mark of that thing’.74 
More precisely,  
assuming that an object a has properties P and Q, if the concept of P is a 
component of the concept of Q, then P is a mediate mark of a.75 
                                                        
69 On this distinction, see Houston Smit, ‘Kant on Marks and the Immediacy of Intuition’, 
Philosophical Review, 109 (2000), 235–266, 248–251. Kant’s ambiguous use of “mark” might lead 
to the suspicion that he confuses the ‘properties of things which fall under’ a concept with the 
‘characteristics which make up the concept’ (Gottlob Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: Eine 
logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl, ed. Christian Thiel, Hamburg 1988 
[1884]; trans. The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of 
Number, ed. J. L. Austin, Oxford 1974, § 53). Related objections against Kant’s principle of 
syllogisms are discussed in Wolff, ‘Volkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse’, 348–
350; Ebert, ‘Michael Wolff über Syllogismen bei Aristoteles und Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant’, 365–
366. 
70 Spitzf., 2:47. 
71 I argue that Kant uses a broad notion of object, which includes non-existent items, in ‘Kant on 
Existential Import’, Kantian Review, 19 (2014), 207–232, 221–223. 
72 Spitzf., 2:47. 
73 Kant uses stronger terms than “non-belonging” to designate the relation between subject and 
predicate in negative judgements: “contraposed”, “contradicts”, “contrasting” [entgegen gesetzt, 
widespricht, widerstreitend] (Spitzf., 2:47). These and other expressions may suggest that for Kant, 
ca.1762, all truths are analytic. Charles Nussbaum, among others, holds this. See his ‘Critical and 
Pre-Critical Phases in Kant’s Philosophy of Logic’, Kant-Studien, 83 (1992), 280–293, 280, 284. I do 
not take a stand on this issue. 
74 Spitzf., 2:47. 
75 Further, for every object a and every property P, that belongs to a, P is a mediate mark of a if and 
only if a has a property Q, such that the concept of P is a component of the concept of Q. 
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Consider for instance the concept of bachelor, as represented in Figure 1. That 
concept has some first-level components (the concepts of male, adult, and unmarried), 
which have in turn other components.76 Being a male and being a living being are both 
properties (marksp) of bachelors and the concept of living being is a component (a 
markc) of the concept of male. Hence, being a living being is a mediate mark of a 
bachelor. By contrast, the properties corresponding to first-level components of the 
concept of bachelor (being male, adult, and unmarried) are immediate marks of the 
concept of bachelor.  
Kant’s predecessors and, in the 1780s, Kant himself distinguished between two ways 
of formulating syllogisms or chains of syllogisms. We may entertain the premises and 
infer the conclusion from them, employing syllogism as a tool for discovering truths that 
we had not previously thought of. Alternatively, we may start from the conclusion and 
seek its justification, that is, a reason for asserting the belonging or non-belonging of the 
mediate markp expressed by the predicate to the item(s) referred to by the subject. In this 
case, we look for a middle term which we can combine with the subject and the 
predicate, so as to formulate two sentences which we take to be true and from which we 
can derive the conclusion.77  
In the False Subtlety, Kant regards syllogism as a tool for justification, rather than 
discovery. He defines a syllogism as a ‘judgement which is made by means of a mediate 
mark’. ‘In other words, a syllogism is the comparison of a mark with a thing by means 
of an intermediate mark’.78 The comparison presupposes that the conclusion is being 
thought and it aims to establish its truth. It should lead us ‘clearly to recognise the 
relation of the mark [the predicate of the conclusion] to the thing [its subject]’.79 If the 
conclusion is an affirmative judgement, the relation that it expresses is that the predicate 
belongs to the subject.80 We should look for an intermediate mark (a middle term) that 
gives us reason to believe that the predicate belongs to the subject.81 More specifically, 
we should look for a markc of the subject concept, of which the predicate is in turn a 
markc: 
In order clearly to recognise the relation of the mark to the thing in the judgment: the human 
soul is a mind, I employ the intermediate mark rational, so that, by its means, I regard being 
a mind as a mediate mark of the human soul. In this case, three judgements must necessarily 
occur: 
1. Being a mind is a mark of that which is rational; 
2. Rational is a mark of the human soul; 
3. Being a mind is a mark of the human soul. 
                                                        
76 I set aside the possibility that they may be simple, unanalysable concepts for the sake of simplicity. 
77 Hollmann, Philosophia rationalis, § 447; Reimarus, Vernunftlehre, § 150; Lambert, Neues Organon, 
vol. 1, 154–155; A331/B387–388. 
78 Spitzf., 2:48. 
79 Spitzf., 2:48. 
80 More precisely, it states that the mark expressed by the predicate belongs to the item(s) referred to by 
the subject. I omit the italicized expressions for the sake of simplicity. 
81 Traditional logic provided a set of rules, called pons asinorum, for finding suitable middle terms. 
Andreas Rüdiger formulated a new version of those rules. Kant mentions them neither in the False 
Subtlety nor, as far as I am aware, elsewhere. See Heinrich Schepers, ‘Eselsbrücke’, in Ritter et al. 
(eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 2, 743–745. 
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[…] Cast in the form of judgements, the three operations would run: all that is rational is a 
mind; the soul of man is rational; therefore, the soul of man is a mind.82 
If, instead, we want to establish a negative conclusion, we should look for a markc of its 
subject, which is incompatible with a markc of the predicate.  
If the premises of the resulting syllogism contain mediate markc of the subjects, they 
can be established through further syllogisms. If they contain immediate marks, ideally, 
we will recognize their truth through experience or intuition.83 Readers may wonder why 
the process could not unfold the other way round: start from judgements established 
through experience or intuition and deduce new conclusions from them. The False 
Subtlety does not answer this question. It leaves the reader wondering why Kant does 
not echo Daries’ view that ‘syllogisms are a means of invention’,84 but portrays them 
solely as tools for justifying propositions by seeking suitable middle terms.85  
2.2 The Foundations of Syllogistic Inference 
We have seen that Kant identifies syllogism with the activity of asserting that some 
marks belong or do not belong to things on the ground that they belong, or are 
incompatible with, some of their other marks. Kant’s principles of syllogisms explain 
why we are entitled to make these assertions: 
[T]he first general rule of all affirmative syllogisms [i.e. syllogisms whose conclusion is an 
affirmative sentence] is this: A mark of a mark is a mark of the thing itself (nota notae est 
etiam nota rei ipsius). And the first general rule of all negative syllogisms is this: that which 
contradicts the mark of a thing, contradicts the thing itself (repugnans notae repugnat rei 
ipsi).86 
Kant goes on to explain that his principles state the reasons for the truth of the dictum 
de omni et nullo. He formulates the dictum de omni as: ‘that which is universally 
affirmed of a concept, is also affirmed of everything that falls under that concept’.87 
What is affirmed of a concept is a mark. It can be affirmed of the things that fall under 
the concept because, as the nota notae principle states, a mark of a mark of a concept is 
a mark of the things that fall under it.88 The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the 
dictum de nullo. Kant also claims that his principles are first principles as they cannot be 
proven from more basic principles. This is because ‘a proof is only possible by means of 
one or more syllogisms’ and any syllogisms presuppose the truth of his principles.89  
                                                        
82 Spitzf., 2:48. Kant provides a similar example for negative judgements. 
83 For Kant’s views on intuition as a source of justification, see Section 3.2. 
84 Daries, Introductio in artem inveniendi, Praecognita § 128n. 
85 In 1781 too, Kant regards logic as a tool not for generating cognitions, but only for assessing them 
(A60/B84, A796/B824). This does not shed light on why the False Subtlety, which was published 19 
years earlier, is silent on whether we can use syllogisms for invention. 
86 Spitzf., 2:49. 
87 Spitzf., 2:49, trans. modified. 
88 Kant combines this explanation with the claims that lower concepts are abstracted from things and 
higher concepts are abstracted from lower concepts. Kant’s explanation is independent from those 
claims. 
89 Spitzf., 2:49. 
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Kant’s nota notae and repugnans notae principles cannot be found in the works of his 
immediate predecessors.90 Aristotle stated the nota notae principle in the Prior 
Analytics,91 but I have found no evidence that Kant was aware of this. The view that the 
nota notae and repugnans notae principles provide the foundation of the dictum is not 
found in Aristotle either. It was probably an original claim of Kant. However, Kant 
grossly overstates his originality when he claims that the dictum de omni and the dictum 
de nullo are ‘the principles which all logicians have hitherto regarded as the first rules of 
all syllogisms’.92 On the one hand, those who regarded them as principles of syllogisms, 
like Wolff, did not regard them as first principles. They took them to derive from the law 
of contradiction. On the other hand, in putting forward new principles of syllogisms, 
Kant was not departing from ‘all logicians’. He was following on the footsteps of 
Crusius, Daries, Meier, and Reimarus, all of whom had proposed new principles of 
syllogisms.93 It is hard to believe that Kant’s overstatement was unintentional. Kant had 
read the texts in which they propose those new principles.94 He also commented on 
Meier’s discussions of syllogism for more than ten times in the logic courses that he 
held before 1762.95  
                                                        
90 They are similar, but not identical to the principles of judgments of Kant’s New Elucidation of 1755. 
Cf. Sgarbi, Logica e metafisica nel Kant precritico, 208. 
91 Rovira, ‘¿Es una “falsa sutileza” la division lógica de las figuras del silogismo?’, 15. 
92 Spitzf., 2:49. 
93 Other aspects of the False Subtlety are not particularly original. (1) Kant’s conception of the role of 
syllogism is similar to Reimarus’ characterization of syllogism as a way of establishing the 
agreement or contrast between the subject and predicate of ‘judgements of mediate insight’ 
(Vernunftlehre, §§ 137–138). It also recalls earlier definitions of syllogism, e.g. by Baumeister, 
Institutiones philosophiae rationalis, § 237, and Hollmann, Philosophia rationalis, § 446, besides the 
passages of the Port-Royal Logic and Segner’s De syllogismo mentioned in Mirella Capozzi and 
Gino Roncaglia, ‘Logic and Philosophy of Logic from Humanism to Kant’, in Leila Haaparanta (ed.), 
The Development of Modern Logic, New York 2009, 78–158, 102, and in Sgarbi, Logica e metafisica 
nel Kant precritico, 208. See also a passage by Johann Heinrich Lambert, whose date of composition 
is unknown (in his Logische und philosophische Abhandlungen, ed. Johann Bernoulli, Berlin 1782, 
vol. 1, 230), and the passages by Sulzer and ’s Gravesande quoted in Sgarbi, Logica e metafisica nel 
Kant precritico, 208. (2) Reimarus mentioned that syllogisms can serve for discovery besides 
justification. Yet, his account of syllogism, like Kant’s, focuses on the search for premises to justify 
conclusions. For a well-known precedent, see Arnauld and Nicole, The Port-Royal Logic, 191: ‘the 
conclusion is supposed before we make the syllogism to prove it’. (3) Before Kant, Meier and 
Reimarus had used the term “Vernunftschluß” to designate syllogisms. See Meier, Vernunftlehre, § 
390; Meier, Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, § 354; Reimarus, Vernunftlehre, §§ 134, 354.  
94 The only possible exception is Daries’ Introductio in artem inveniendi. Crusius was one of Kant’s 
main philosophical influences in the 1750s and 1760s. Kant refers to a passage of his Weg zur 
Gewißheit in Spitzf., 2:54n, 55. Kant used Meier’s Auszug and, possibly, his Vernunftlehre as 
textbooks for his logic lectures since the 1750s. Kant owned and read Reimarus’ Vernunftlehre. See 
Arthur Warda, Immanuel Kants Bücher: Mit einer getreuten Nachbildung des bisher einzigen 
bekannten Abzuges des Versteigerungskataloges der Bibliothek Kants, Berlin 1922, 53; Größen, 
2:191. Reimarus’ Vernunftlehre is the likely source of several of Kant’s views. See J. Bergmann, 
‘Zur Lehre Kants von den logischen Grundsätzen’, Kant-Studien, 2 (1898), 323–348, 330; Norbert 
Hinske, ‘Reimarus zwischen Wolff und Kant: Zur Quellen- und Wirkungsgeschichte der 
“Vernunftlehre” von Hermann Samuel Reimarus’, in Wolfgang Walter and Ludwig Borinski (ed.), 
Logik im Zeitalter der Aufklärung: Studien zur ‘Vernunftlehre’ von Hermann Samuel Reimarus, 
Göttingen 1980, 9–32; Michael Oberhausen, Das neue Apriori: Kants Lehre von einer 
ursprünglicher Erwerbung apriorischer Vorstellungen, Stuttgart 1997, 99–112. 
95 Kant held 13 lecture courses on logic between the beginning of his teaching and the winter semester 
1761/1762. He might have used Baumeister’s textbook during some of the earlier courses. See Steve 
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Worse still, one of the reasons why Reimarus and, in all likelihood, Meier rejected 
the dictum as the foundation of syllogisms spells trouble for Kant’s new principles too. 
Meier would not have complemented the dictum with three other principles if he thought 
that the dictum alone provides the foundation of all syllogisms. Reimarus openly 
complained that the dictum applies only to first-figure syllogisms.96 Kant’s new 
principles do not apply to all syllogisms either. They fail to apply to some second-, 
third-, and fourth-figure syllogisms.97 Consider for instance an affirmative syllogism of 
the third figure (in Disamis, IAI-3): 
 
 Some painters are creative. 
 All painters are visual artists. 
∴ Some visual artists are creative. 
 
In Kant’s terms, the syllogism ascribes a mark (creativity) to certain things (some visual 
artists). If the syllogism conformed to Kant’s nota notae principle, it would ascribe 
creativity to some visual artists on the ground that they have another mark, which is 
expressed by the middle term (being a painter). Yet, the syllogism does not state that 
some visual artists are painters. It states the opposite, namely, that all painters are visual 
artists.98 It follows that the syllogism, as it is, does not conform to Kant’s principle.  
As an example of a negative syllogism, consider a second-figure syllogism in Baroco 
(AOO-2): 
 
 All good historians have good memory. 
 Some academics do not have good memory. 
∴ Some academics are not good historians. 
 
The syllogism concerns some academics. It denies that they have the mark of being 
good historians. If the syllogisms conformed to Kant’s repugnans notae principle, it 
would deny that they have that mark on the ground that it is incompatible with another 
mark of theirs. Yet, the syllogism does not deny that some academics are good historians 
because this is incompatible with a mark that they have, but because it entails having a 
feature (good memory) that they lack.99  
It may seem surprising that, even though he had read Meier’s and Reimarus’ texts, 
Kant proposed principles that fail to apply to all second-, third-, and fourth-figure 
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96 Reimarus, Vernunftlehre, § 139. 
97 As we shall see, Kant proposes a method to transform them into syllogisms which conform to his 
principles. However, by Kant’s own admission, this method cannot be applied to the affirmative 
forms of the fourth figure (Bamalip and Dimatis). 
98 If we replaced “all painters are visual artists” with “some visual artists are painters”, which we can 
infer from it by conversion, we would obtain an invalid syllogism with form III-1. 
99 As an example of a fourth-figure syllogism that does not conform to Kant’s principles, consider the 
following syllogism in Baralip (AAI-4): all phones are artefacts; all artefacts are material objects; 
some material objects are phones. If the syllogism conformed to the nota notae principle, it would 
predicate being a phone of some material objects on the ground that being a phone is a mark of one 
of their marks. Yet, the syllogism does not ascribe any other marks to material objects, besides being 
a phone. Hence, the syllogism does not conform to the nota notae principle. 
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syllogisms. Kant was aware of this. He writes that ‘the supreme rules governing all 
syllogisms lead directly to that order of concepts which is called the first figure’.100 To 
appreciate Kant’s motivation for focusing on first-figure syllogisms, we must turn to his 
views on the status and usefulness of the other figures.  
2.3 The Status and Usefulness of the Second, Third, and Fourth Figure 
The reason why Kant regards the principle of the first figure as the principle of all 
syllogisms is that, like Wolff, he subordinates the other figures to the first. He does not 
go as far as to claim that all valid second-, third-, or fourth-figure syllogisms are actually 
‘cryptic first-figure syllogisms’.101 However, he does claim that they are valid only 
insofar as they can be reduced to the first figure. More precisely, he claims that they are 
valid only if their conclusion can be derived by carrying out immediate inferences on 
one or both premises and formulating a first-figure syllogism.102 An example of this 
procedure is the reduction of a second-figure syllogism in Camestres (AEE-2) to a first-
figure syllogism in Celarent (EAE-1) that we encountered in Section 1.2. The nota 
notae and repugnans notae principles ground the validity of first-figure syllogisms and 
these, along with immediate inferences, ground the validity of all other syllogisms.103 
Hence, the nota notae and repugnans notae principles ground, directly or indirectly, the 
validity of all syllogisms.  
Kant’s claim is not just that the reduction of non-first-figure syllogisms to the first 
figure provides a reason for regarding them as valid. Kant claims that they are valid only 
insofar as they can be reduced to the first figure. They should be called mixed or hybrid 
syllogisms because they are ‘only possible by combining more than three 
judgements’,104 the fourth (and, in some cases, fifth) judgement being obtained through 
an immediate inference from one of the premises. By contrast, first-figure syllogisms are 
not mixed, but pure. This is because they do not require that ‘there must be inserted 
between’ the premises ‘some immediate inference which has been drawn from one or 
other of them, if the argument is to be valid [bündig]’.105 This and similar statements106 
imply that the validity of non-first-figure syllogisms depends on the possibility of 
deriving their conclusion from the premises by means of immediate inferences and a 
first-figure syllogism. 
As we saw above, valid syllogisms can be established through the method of 
principles, without reducing them to a privileged class. One can formulate a series of 
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rules to which all valid syllogisms must conform and exclude the forms which violate 
them. Kant was aware of the possibility of employing this method. He could find it 
applied, inter alia, in Knutzen’s logic manual. He used it in a personal note from the 
1750s.107 Although Kant knew that valid syllogisms can be established through the 
method of principles, he did not explain why he privileged the reductive method in the 
False Subtlety.  
Just two years after the publication of the False Subtlety, Lambert would put forward 
proofs of the validity of syllogisms in each figure which do not rely on their reduction to 
any other figure. He took his proofs to show the mistake of those who 
were misled to go as far as to regard the last three figures as indirect and capable only of a 
mediate proof, and to reject them as entirely unnatural, even though they admitted the 
validity of inferences in those figures.108 
Kant’s view in the False Subtlety fits this description. Lambert’s views would put 
pressure on those who rely on the reductive method to make the reasons for this choice 
explicit in a way that Kant did not do.  
Kant’s claim that any other syllogistic forms are valid only insofar as they can be 
reduced to the first figure entails that the forms which do not satisfy this constraint 
should be rejected. In fact, Kant denies the legitimacy of the syllogisms whose 
conclusion, to his mind, cannot be derived from the premises through immediate 
inferences and first-figure syllogisms. These are the affirmative forms of the fourth 
figure (Bamalip and Dimatis), which, however, are both valid.109 Instead of calling them 
invalid,110 Kant states, rather vaguely, that they are ‘not possible […] at all’.111 He 
provides a second reason for rejecting them, besides the fact that they cannot be reduced 
to the first figure with his favoured method. The reason is that their premises do not state 
the ground in virtue of which, if they are true, the conclusion too is true.112 Since Kant 
does not spell out the relevant notion of ground or the reason why syllogistic premises 
should provide such a ground, his brief remark is hardly convincing as it stands.  
Kant does not only state that the validity of syllogisms should be established through 
a reductive method, but he also claims that people follow it in their reasoning. He states 
that, when people infer the conclusion of a mixed syllogism from their premises (or, on 
Michael Wolff’s reading, when they do so by running through all the required inferential 
steps113), they employ immediate inferences and a first-figure syllogism. In other words, 
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ordinary people retrace the process that the Kantian philosopher employs to justify the 
validity of syllogisms. Kant highlights this in a series of incidental remarks. For 
instance, he writes that the ‘power to establish a conclusion [Schlußkraft]’ of a mixed 
syllogism ‘depends upon the tacit addition’ of an ‘immediate inference, which has to be 
present if only in thought’.114  
Kant’s psychological claim raises a worry for those who, like him, are concerned 
with the naturalness of inferential processes. Kant’s concern with naturalness is most 
apparent when he complains that ‘[t]he mode of inference’ in the fourth figure ‘is highly 
unnatural and depends upon a large number of intermediate inferences, which have to be 
supposed to be interpolated’.115 The reductions proposed by Kant for second- and third-
figure syllogisms too require the interpolation of immediate inferences. For that reason, 
one could complain that they are harder and slower to carry out (less natural2 and 
natural3) than the original syllogisms. This is what Lambert claimed with regard to the 
example in Section 1.2. Even Feder, who agreed with Kant’s views on how we derive 
the conclusions of second-, third-, and fourth-figure syllogisms, held that some of them 
are more natural than the corresponding combinations of immediate inferences and first-
figure syllogisms.116 If we have a disposition to make easier and faster inferences, rather 
than more complex and slower ones, we are more likely to infer the conclusions of 
second-, third-, or fourth-figure syllogisms directly from their premises than to employ 
Kant’s reduction procedure. 
Presumably, Kant held that his favoured reduction procedure can be applied easily 
and quickly enough not to raise any concerns about unnaturalness. He states that his 
procedure lacks the ‘futile tediousness’ of other procedures. He claims that, given the 
conclusion and the middle term, one can employ his favoured reductions ‘instantly’.117 
Yet, as Lambert might reply, whether the reduction outlined in Section 1.2 is performed 
instantly is by no means uncontroversial.  
In this section, we have seen that the False Subtlety portrays syllogisms as tools for 
justification, as opposed to invention. Kant does not provide any reasons for 
disregarding invention. He puts forward two principles of syllogisms which are original, 
if compared with those proposed by his peers, even though formulating new principles 
of syllogisms was itself a conventional move. Kant’s principles directly apply to first-
figure syllogisms. They ground other syllogisms in virtue of their reducibility to the first 
figure. Kant’s emphasis on a specific kind of reduction, carried out through immediate 
inferences and first-figure syllogisms, is rather original. However, Kant does not explain 
why we should only rely on reductions, as opposed to the method of principles, in order 
to ground the validity of syllogisms. He does not provide any clear, persuasive reasons 
for dismissing the syllogistic forms that, in his view, do not suit his reductive strategy 
(Bamalip and Dimatis). His claims on the psychological primacy of the first figure and 
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on the employment of syllogistic reductions raise worries about their naturalness, which 
Kant does not address. In conclusion, the False Subtlety does not provide sufficient 
justification for Kant’s silence on whether syllogisms can aid invention, the primacy that 
he assigns to the first figure, and his choice of privileging the reductive method, while 
disregarding the method of principles.  
3 The False Subtlety, Kant’s Immediate Predecessors, and Kant’s Works from 1762–
1764 
One might hope to explain Kant’s silence on whether syllogisms can aid invention, the 
primacy that he assigned to the first figure, and his choice of privileging the reductive 
method by looking at the works of his peers and immediate predecessors. Kant might 
have followed some of them closely, implicitly accepting their justification for certain 
views. If he strongly opposed other authors, this opposition might help explain why he 
took certain stances. Alternatively, one might seek an explanation for Kant’s views on 
syllogism by looking at the doctrines that he endorsed in his other works from the early 
1760s. This section examines the relation between Kant’s views in the False Subtlety, 
those of his immediate predecessors, and the doctrines outlined in Kant’s other works 
from 1762–1764.  
3.1 The False Subtlety and Kant’s Immediate Predecessors 
Traditionally, Kant’s pre-Critical works have been read in the light of a familiar 
developmental story. Before becoming a Critical philosopher, Kant is said to have been 
first a Leibniz-Wolffian rationalist and, later, a Lockean or Humean empiricist.118 It is 
tempting to interpret the False Subtlety in the light of this evolutionary schema, focusing 
especially on its relation to Leibniz and Wolff. The False Subtlety has been said to be 
influenced by Leibniz, Wolff, or opposed to their views.  
Contrary to Silvestro Marcucci’s suggestion, the False Subtlety makes no explicit 
effort to criticize ‘Leibniz’s syllogistic logic’.119 Leibniz is not mentioned in the False 
Subtlety and was not often mentioned in discussions of syllogism by Wolff, Crusius, 
Reimarus, and Kant’s other contemporaries or immediate predecessors. Adolfo León 
Gómez holds that, nevertheless, Leibniz influenced Kant’s views both (a) directly, 
through his reading of the New Essays, and (b) indirectly, through Wolff’s influence.120 
We can safely rule out (a), at least with regard to the False Subtlety, because it was 
published in 1762, three years before the New Essays. As for (b), there are two reasons 
to doubt that Leibniz’s views on the foundation of syllogism influenced Kant via Wolff. 
First, Leibniz does not figure prominently in Wolff’s discussions of syllogism.121 
Second, the distinctive, ‘contra-traditionary’122 aspect of Leibniz’s discussion of 
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syllogism in the New Essays is his preference for indirect reductions, which employ 
reductio ad absurdum. In the False Subtlety, Kant puts forward a different strategy, 
based on immediate inferences. He does not mention or criticize Leibniz’s strategy.123  
According to Michael Wolff, Kant’s claim that only first-figure syllogisms are pure is 
directed against Christian Wolff’s view that syllogisms of all figures are pure.124 
However, as we saw in Section 1, Wolff too gave pride of place to the first figure. Like 
Kant, he claimed that ‘the inferences that take place in the second and third figure can be 
accepted as valid only because it is possible to reduce them to the first figure’.125 Wolff 
and Kant also agreed that the first figure is the most natural, that people privilege it in 
their ordinary reasoning, and that any other syllogisms should be accepted because they 
can be reduced to the first figure.126  
Rather than to Wolff’s views, Kant’s views on syllogism are opposed to those of 
Crusius, who held that logic should discuss all four figures and that we sometimes 
reason more quickly and easily (hence, more naturally) by employing second-, third-, 
and fourth-figure syllogisms than first-figure syllogisms. However, Kant does not 
outline his views on the foundations of syllogistic inference by contrasting them with 
Crusius’ views. He criticizes him only in passing, for his discussion of the fourth 
figure.127 This is surprising, given that Kant was keen to criticize Crusius whenever he 
had a chance in the early 1760s.128 Moreover, Kant’s views are as far from Crusius’ as 
they are from those of the Wolffian Martin Knutzen, who privileged the method of 
principles and dismissed syllogistic reductions as useless. Hence, it would be wrong to 
read the False Subtlety through the lens of the dichotomy of Wolffianism and anti-
Wolffianism.  
In his other works from the 1760s, Kant outlines several doctrines by criticizing other 
authors. For instance, he introduces his theory of existence by contrasting it with 
Baumgarten’s, Wolff’s, and Crusius’ theories.129 He develops his account of the 
principles of metaphysics by engaging with Crusius’ account.130 By contrast, the False 
Subtlety does not contain any explicit, extended engagement with the views of other 
authors. References not only to Crusius, but also to any other authors are scarce and 
sometimes imprecise. Kant unfairly classifies all earlier logicians as upholders of the 
view that all four figures are on a par. He mistakenly claims that they all endorsed the 
dictum, even though the texts he had read, like Reimarus’ Vernunftlehre, prove 
otherwise.131  
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All this indicates, first, that the False Subtlety is not mainly the result of Kant’s 
endorsement of the views of his immediate predecessors. Despite some affinities with 
the views of Wolff and others,132 the principles of syllogisms and the reduction strategy 
that the False Subtlety puts forward are not found among Kant’s immediate 
predecessors. Second, the False Subtlety is not mainly the result of Kant’s polemical 
engagement with the views of specific authors. We cannot explain Kant’s silence on 
whether syllogisms can aid invention, the primacy that he assigned to the first figure, 
and his choice of privileging the reductive method by looking at the relation between his 
views and those of his peers.  
3.2 The False Subtlety and Kant’s Works from the Early 1760s 
Kant’s texts from the early 1760s do not provide solid reasons for his focus on syllogism 
as a tool for justification, his focus on the first figure, and his employment of the 
reductive method. However, they allow us to see why Kant found these choices 
attractive. This is because they fit in closely with the theory of the method of 
metaphysics that Kant developed in his other works from 1762–1764, especially the 
Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality.  
Kant’s concern with the method of metaphysics in the early 1760s derives from his 
bleak assessment of the status of philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular. 
‘Claims to philosophical cognition generally enjoy the fate of opinions and are like the 
meteors, the brilliance of which is no guarantee of their endurance’.133 Metaphysics is a 
‘dark and shoreless ocean’ and all attempts to develop metaphysical systems had 
failed.134 In Kant’s eyes, the failure of Wolff’s metaphysics depends largely on his 
employment of a mathematical method.135 Conversely, Kant’s hopes of success in this 
discipline rely on his belief that he had identified the true method of metaphysics.136  
The method advocated by Kant is based on intuition and conceptual analysis. 
Metaphysical inquiries address questions such as what time is and whether bodies are 
made up of simple substances.137 The concepts of the objects of metaphysics, such as 
those of time and body, are given to us before we raise those questions, but only 
‘confusedly or in an insufficiently determinate fashion’.138 To answer a metaphysical 
question, we should analyse the relevant concepts 
in all kinds of relation […]: different marks which have been abstracted have to be 
combined together to see whether they yield an adequate concept; they have to be collated 
with each other to see whether one mark does not partly include another within itself.139 
In doing so, we should bear in mind that not all concepts can be analysed. Some are 
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unanalysable because they have no marks, others because our cognitive limits prevent us 
from identifying them.140  
Given an analysable concept, we should identify its immediate and mediate marks. 
This process unfolds through acts of judgement, because ‘a distinct concept [that is, a 
concept of which we can enumerate some marks] is possible only by means of a 
judgement’.141 Every true judgement that identifies a markc of a concept (and the 
corresponding markp of the things that fall under that concept) is true in virtue of the law 
of identity: ‘to every subject there belongs a predicate which is identical with it’.142 
Every true judgement that denies a mark of a concept is true in virtue of the law of 
contradiction: ‘to no subject does there belong a predicate which contradicts it’.143  
As we saw in Section 2.1, marks are either mediate or immediate. According to Kant, 
we become aware that an immediate mark is part of the content of a concept through an 
act of intuition. Intuition makes us aware of an ‘identity’ or ‘contradiction’ that ‘is to be 
found immediately in the concepts’ and ‘cannot or may not be understood through 
analysis by means of intermediate marks’.144  
The belonging of a mediate mark B to a concept a is not revealed by intuition. It must 
be established through a syllogism. We must look for a mark of a of which B is in turn a 
mark, so that we can apply the nota notae principle: ‘A mark of a mark is a mark of the 
thing itself ’.145 For instance, in order to establish that divisibility is a mark of bodies, we 
can employ the intermediate mark “compound”. The judgements “bodies are 
compound” and “what is compound is divisible” ascribe immediate marks to their 
subjects and we can be intuitively aware of their truth. They provide the premises of a 
first-figure syllogism whose conclusion is “bodies are divisible”.146  
The cognitions that we establish in this way are to be organized in a system. Intuition 
warrants the truth of its basic or, in Kant’s terms, indemonstrable propositions. 
Syllogisms warrant the truth of demonstrable propositions, which we deduce from 
indemonstrable propositions and previously proven propositions. The nota notae and 
repugnans notae principles ensure the validity of the syllogisms employed. The ensuing 
metaphysical system aims to represent the basic structure of the world. ‘To use the 
terminology of school-philosophers, at that time’ Kant conceived of the world itself as ‘a 
system of species and genera, subordinated to one another according to the law of 
identity’.147  
Kant’s account of syllogism in the False Subtlety is in keeping with the functions that 
he assigns to syllogisms within the method of metaphysics. To begin with, Kant holds 
that we derive metaphysical truths by analysing concepts that are ‘given’ to us 
‘confusedly’.148 Syllogisms must justify those truths by deducing them from 
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indemonstrable propositions and from previously proven propositions. Accordingly, the 
False Subtlety portrays syllogism as a tool for justification, not for invention.  
In the second place, Kant’s method of metaphysics employs syllogisms to justify the 
ascription or denial of mediate marks to things, based on the ascription or denial of 
immediate marks to them. The two principles introduced in the False Subtlety, the nota 
notae and repugnans notae principles, spell out the rationale of these ascriptions more 
clearly than the dictum. The syllogisms which are used for these ascriptions are first-
figure syllogisms.  
To be sure, second-, third-, and fourth-figure syllogisms may be helpful for Kant’s 
purposes. As Lambert would note in his New Organon, one can employ the second 
figure to ‘prove differences between things, the third’ to ‘prove examples and 
exceptions’, and ‘the fourth’ to ‘rule out’ relations between species and kinds.149 All of 
these actions can be useful to build the kind of metaphysical system that Kant was 
contemplating in the early 1760s. Nevertheless, Kant’s method of metaphysics focuses 
on the identification of relations of inclusion and exclusion between concepts, which are 
established through first-figure syllogisms. Their central role within Kant’s theory of 
metaphysics parallels the pride of place that they have within the False Subtlety.  
Finally, Kant’s foundation of the second, third, and fourth figure through a reductive 
method fits in nicely with the architectonic structure of his philosophy. If Kant had 
followed the method of principles, he would have identified numerous principles, which 
he would have employed to reduce the number of valid syllogistic forms from 256 to 19. 
By following the reductive method, Kant can put forward just two principles of all 
syllogisms, which parallel the principles of judgements. On the one hand, Kant admits 
two principles of true judgements, the laws of identity and contradiction. He claims that 
all truths depend on them. He relates them respectively to affirmative and negative 
truths. On the other hand, Kant admits two principles of valid syllogisms, the nota notae 
and repugnans notae principles. He claims that the validity of all syllogisms depends on 
them. He relates them respectively to affirmative and negative syllogisms.  
It is well known that Kant paid much attention to architectonic considerations, as the 
structure of his Critical works makes apparent. Architectonic considerations alone 
cannot warrant Kant’s claims on the principles of syllogisms. Nevertheless, they explain 
why Kant found it attractive to claim that all valid syllogistic forms are grounded on the 
nota notae and repugnans notae principles.  
We have seen that Kant’s theory of the method of metaphysics fits in closely with his 
focus on syllogism as a tool for justification, on the first figure, and his employment of 
the reductive method. There are two reasons why this fit helps explain Kant’s views on 
syllogism. To begin with, Kant held that identifying the method of metaphysics is 
crucial for its success. Kant wrote in 1763 that he had meditated on this topic for 
years.150 Although he was duty-bound to teach logic semester after semester, Kant did 
not think that the theory of syllogism was nearly as important as the methodology of 
metaphysics. He took the doctrine of moods and figures to be useless151 and he called 
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the False Subtlety ‘the labour of a few hours’.152 It is understandable that his views in an 
occasional work on a topic of secondary importance were influenced by the ideas which 
he was spending much time and many efforts on.  
Moreover, it is well known that the Critical Kant was keen to map central notions and 
distinctions of his epistemology-cum-metaphysics onto formal-logical notions and 
distinctions. This tendency is not confined to Kant’s Critical works. In the early 1760s, 
Kant draws several parallels between logical and metaphysical notions: logical ground 
and real ground,153 logical opposition and real opposition,154 logical necessity and real 
necessity,155 formal principles and material principles.156 Kant’s endorsement of a 
doctrine of syllogism that reflects its role within metaphysics is yet another expression 
of his tendency to relate formal-logical views to epistemological and metaphysical 
views.  
This chapter has examined the relation of the False Subtlety with its intellectual 
context, including the works of Kant’s immediate predecessors and Kant’s other works 
from the early 1760s. This examination supports two conclusions. First, the False 
Subtlety is a moderately original work. The principles of syllogisms and the reduction 
strategy that Kant puts forward are original with respect to his intellectual context. 
However, the False Subtlety is far from displaying the level of innovation and autonomy 
from Kant’s cultural environment that can be found in his later, Critical works. Kant’s 
choice of putting forward new principles of syllogism was a rather conventional one, 
having been pursued by Crusius, Daries, Meier and Reimarus, among others. His claims 
on the primacy and naturalness of the first figure recall similar claims by Wolff. At any 
rate, the False Subtlety was not mainly the result of Kant’s endorsement or rejection of 
the views of his predecessors.  
Second, the False Subtlety has some puzzling features, for which Kant provides little 
or no reason. These are his focus on syllogism as a tool for justification, his focus on the 
first figure, and his employment of the reductive method for the foundation of 
syllogisms. These features of the False Subtlety can be explained by considering the 
relation between Kant’s logical and metaphysical views. Kant endorses a view of 
syllogism that is in line with, and influenced by, his conception of the method of 
metaphysics. Thus, the study of the False Subtlety confirms the importance of reading 
Kant’s formal logic and his epistemology-cum-metaphysics in the light of one another. 
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